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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SUPREME COURT AS A GUARDIAN
The Supreme Court addressed the great issues of religious faith and
practice only rarely during its first century of operation.

It usually

let state law and local custom prevail except where some larger
constitutional value was at stake.

Even in the first decades of this

century, the Court was circumspect in its treatment of religious
controversies.

Most of the cases that directly implicated the religion

clauses in these early years involved members of religious minorities,
particularly Mormons and Catholics.
issues~~which

The Court weighed the religious

often played only a minor part in the Court's final

determination~-on

the scales of a generalized Christian standard of

personal morality and public expression without explicitly defining
religion.

Specific cultic practices that threatened to disturb public

peace and order simply fell outside the pale of free exercise
protections.

This early period is covered in Chapter Seven.

The justices began to negotiate more precise constitutional metes
and bounds in earnest during the 1940s after the Court decided that the
Fourteenth Amendment made the free exercise and establishment provisions
of the First Amendment applicable to the states and localities.

A rough

sketch of acceptable practices and legitimate regulations began to
emerge.

With a few exceptions, such as the polygamy cases, the Court

had until then carefully avoided taking an activist role in the area of
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religion.

But in its efforts to correct some definite abuses and

constitutional problems in the local regulation of religious
proselytism, the Court perhaps needlessly broadened its jurisdiction,
leaving it open to a myriad of competing claims and counterclaims.
Moving from the protection of what one commentator called "a sect
distinguished by great religious zeal and astonishing powers of
annoyance,"
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the Court then began taking up the complex financial,

pedagogical, and social issues that, since 1947, have become the primary
focus of its deliberations on the place of religion in the proper study
of mankind.

These later years are covered in Chapter Eight.
Accommodation

Although the religion clauses of the Constitution were not
subjected to close scrutiny by the Supreme Court until late in the
nineteenth century, religious issues figured in a few cases that reveal
much about the Americanization of common law principles and the
evolution of the constitutional tradition.

While most of these cases

concerned church property, wills, and unincorporated religious
societies, some of them anticipated the issues of religious liberty that
began to fill the Court's docket at the start of World War Two.
The first cases to reach the Court early in the nineteenth century
are indicative of the difficult legal transition from a tradition of
church establishments to the new system of free churches.

During the

colonial period, only the established churches and a privileged minority
of the dissenting churches were able to protect their property by means
of incorporation.

Ever since the Tudor period, established churches
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operated as municipal corporations vested with the ability to acquire
property and govern their affairs, raise revenues, and compel attendance
at their services.
All this changed when, following the War for Independence, one
church establishment after another was dissolved.

Suffrage was extended

to dissenters in places where Catholics, Jews, Baptists, Unitarians, and
Quakers had once been excluded.

Mortmain statutes that limited the

rights of churches disappeared.

But despite these changes, much

remained the same.
offices.

A few states barred clergymen from holding public

Religious corporations were treated as creatures of the state.

Title to church property had to be vested either in lay trustees or in
the clergy as corporations sole, rather than in the ruling
ecclesiastical body, thus reinforcing a pronounced bias in favor of
congregational forms of church government.

Hierarchical churches, such

as the Roman Catholic Church, were consequently disadvantaged.
According to Patrick J. Dignan:
The American legal theory of corporations is fundamentally the same
as that of English law. There can be no corporation which is not
the creation of the civil law, and all tenure of property likewise
required civil authority. The Church enjoys a large measure of
freedom, bu~ the law does not, within the United States, deal with
it as such.
The early Supreme Court cases involving trusts, bequests, and
police powers helped establish a pattern of accommodation, secular
control, and dependency that has characterized the interaction of church
and state ever since.

Despite the growth of practical religious

liberty, some of the habits of state intervention have continued to
persist and have lately grown in various and subtle ways.

In the

absence of an official religious establishment, the unifying value of an
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ideological common ground has had to be pursued by other means.
Historically, these means have included political and religious
pluralism, national symbols and ceremonies, nonsectarian education, a
national language, and the secularization of religious traditions into a
common moral code.
Trusts and Bequests
In Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 (1815), the Court upheld the
vested property rights of an Episcopal church and ruled unconstitutional
a Virginia statute confiscating its lands, denying that a state "can
repeal statutes creating private corporations" or "by such repeal can
vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the state .
without the consent or default of the corporators."

By upholding the

right of the former established church of Virginia to retain its
corporate identity and endowments, the Court claimed to stand "upon the
principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free
government, upon the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United
States, and upon the decisions of the most respectable judicial
tribunals. . . " ( 9 Cranch 43, 52).
Justice Story, in a unanimous opinion, discoursed on the limited
powers of the state under a constitutional form of government:
Had the property thus acquired been originally granted by the state
or the king, there might have been some color (and it would have
been but a color) for such an extraordinary pretension. But the
property was, in fact and in law, generally purchased by the
parishioners, or acquired by the benefactions of pious donors. The
title thereto was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather in
their legal agents. It was not in the power of the crown to seize
or assume it; nor of the parliament itself to destroy the grants,
unless by the exercise of a power the most arbitrary, oppressive
and unjust, and endured only because it could not be resisted. It
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was not forfeited; for the churches had committed no offence. The
dissolution of the regal government no more destroyed the right to
possess or enjoy this property than it did the right of any other
corporation or individual to his or its own property. The
dissolution of the form of government did not involve in it a
dissolution of civil rights, or an abolition of the common law
under which the inheritances of every man in the state were held.
The state itself succeeded only to the rights of the crown; and, we
may add, with many a flower of prerogative struck from its hands.
It has been asserted as a principle of the common law that the
division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested
rights of property (9 Cranch 43, 49~50).
But while affirming the right of the legislature to abolish the
exclusive rights and prerogatives once enjoyed by the Episcopal Church,
the Court also upheld the permissibility--if not the duty--of aiding
religion generally:
But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be
restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every
sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing
funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the
endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And that
these purposes could be better secured and cherished by corporate
powers, cannot be doubted by any person who has attended to the
difficulties which surround all voluntary associations. While,
therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens from a
compulsive attendance and payment of taxes in support of any
particular sect, it is not perceived that either public or
constitutional principles required the abolition of all religious
corporations (9 Cranch 43, 49).
In Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292 (1815), a town in Vermont
pressed its claim to a tract of land originally set aside under a
colonial grant as a glebe to support a parish church.

Justice Story,

who again wrote the Court's opinion, held that it was "a clear principle
that the common law in force at the emigration of our ancestors is
deemed the birth right of the colonies unless so far as it is
inapplicable to their situation, or repugnant to their other rights and
privileges" (9 Cranch 292, 333).

Under English common law, the parsons

of Episcopal churches that were duly erected and consecrated had a right
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to the glebe in perpetual succession.

An unappropriated glebe could be

used by the crown for other purposes, but only with the consent of the
town, which was still legally obliged to provide for a church.
In this case, the church had never been built.

The Episcopal

society that later took possession of the glebe was founded only in
1802, long after independence.

The Court upheld the claim of the town

and declared that "a mere voluntary Society of Episcopalians within a
town, unauthorized by the crown, could no more entitle themselves, on
account of their religious tenets, to the glebe, than any other society
worshiping therein" (9 Cranch 292, 334).

The Church of England had

never existed as a corporation but only as an ecclesiastical institution
under the patronage of the state.

It had no legal counterpart in the

independent state of Vermont, where the Church of England had never been
exclusively established.

Since the state had meanwhile succeeded to the

rights of the crown, the town could not apply the land to a purpose
other than public worship without its permission.

But a recent law that

enabled the selectmen of Vermont towns to recover title to
unappropriated glebe lands, then lease them to the town schools,
provided a new option.
Two other cases involved bequests to religious societies.

In

Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheat. 1 (1819), the Court
ruled that the beneficiary of a will, although clearly described as the
Baptist Association, was incapable to taking the trust as a society
since it had not been incorporated at the time.

Chief Justice John

Marshall ruled that the claim of the Baptist Association depended on the
English law of charitable trusts, which had been rejected by Virginia.
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He found nothing to justify the opinion that a ''vaguely expressed"
donation could be established in courts of equity prior to the English
statute of charitable uses under Elizabeth.

Justice Story wrote a very

detailed concurring opinion that was published as a lengthy note
preceding the Court's opinion and was later incorporated into a
treatise.
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Many years later, Justice Horace Gray criticized the Baptist

decision in Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1883), remarking that
it "was decided upon an imperfect survey of the early English
authorities, and upon the theory that the English law of charitable
uses, which, it was admitted, would sustain the bequest, had its origin
in the Statute of Elizabeth, which had been repealed in Virginia."

In a

companion case, Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 182 (1983), Justice
Gray denied that a similar gift to an incorporated religious society was
too indefinite and uncertain to be valid:
It is objected that this corporation is not empowered under its
charter to accept and administer this charity. But it is a novel
proposition, as inconsistent with the rules of law as it is with
the dictates of religion, that a Christian church or religious
society cannot receive and distribute money to poor churches of its
own denomination so as to promote the cause of religion in the
State in which it is established.
Ten years after the Baptist decision, the Court upheld a bequest to
an unincorporated Lutheran society.

Justice Story wrote in Beatty v.

Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566, 584 (1829), that Maryland's Bill of Rights recognized
the doctrines of the Statute of Elizabeth for charitable purposes, even
though it rejected the statute itself: "We think then it might at all
times have been enforced as a charitable and pious use, through the
intervention of the government as parens patriae, by its attorney
general or other law officer."

But by introducing the doctrine of
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parens patriae, which was included among the attributes of sovereignty,
the Court opened the door to the concept of the church as a charitable
public trust.
The Court demonstrated in these cases a desire to be faithful to
both the letter of disestablishment and the spirit of religious liberty,
but it was unable to make a clean break with the establishment tradition
of English common law.

In its early years, the Court often rose to the

defense of vested property rights, including those of churches and
legators, when they required protection from the unforeseen consequences
of a changing political, economic, and social order.

At the same time,

it sought to bring these interests into harmony with the changing
political and economic facts of life.

The result was a selective

incorporation of common law precedents into a growing body of distinctly
republican law.

4

As long as the Court kept the founding principles ever

in view, this process of judicial review helped consolidate a fairly
consistent body of American law.

But there was always a danger that, if

the basic political consensus should ever be lost, such a mixture of
diverse traditions might grow unstable and its different elements be
brought into conflict.
The Girard College Case
The Supreme Court handed down the most important and controversial
decision of this early period in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127
(1844), when it upheld a bequest to the city of Philadelphia to
establish a college "for poor male white orphan children" which,
although it contained anticlerical stipulations, was not expressly
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hostile to Christianity.

The case turned on the technical question of

whether the bequest was too indefinite to be established in a court of
equity.

By upholding the Girard will, the Court practically overturned

its earlier decision against the Baptist Association, citing more recent
scholarship-=including research by Justice Story--on the subject.
But what attracted public attention was the substantive question in
the case: whether the will was contrary to public policy as being
opposed to Christianity.

The Court used the occasion to recall an

earlier blasphemy case and paraphrase its statement to the effect that
"the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania" (2
How. 127, 198). 5

For Justice Story, who wrote the unanimous decision,

this meant that "its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore
it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against,
to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public" (2 How. 127,
198).

But he rejected the appellants' contention, which was argued

eloquently by Walter Jones and Daniel Webster, that the exclusion of
members of the clergy from campus gave evidence that Christianity could
not be taught there.
Why may not laymen instruct in the general principles of
Christianity. There is no restriction as to the religious oplnlons
of the instructors and officers. They may be, and doubtless, under
the auspices of the city government, they will always be, men, not
only distinguished for learning and talent, but for piety and
elevated virtue, and holy lives and characters. And we cannot
overlook the blessings, which such men by their conduct, as well as
their instructions, may, nay must impart to their youthful pupils.
Why may not the Bible, and especially the New Testament, without
note or comment, be read and taught as a divine revelation in the
college~-its general precepts expounded, its evidence explained,
and its glorious principles of morality inculcated? What is there
to prevent a work, not sectarian, upon the great evidences of
Christianity, from being read and taught in the college by
lay-teachers? Certainly there is nothing in the will, that
proscribes such studies (2 How. 127, 200).
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One biographer has detected in the opinion a vindication effort by
Justice Story of the Unitarian faith he claimed as his own against
orthodox critics.

6

Indeed, the issues raised on both sides of the case

bore a strong resemblance to a controversy over the campaign led by
Horace Mann to purge sectarian religious materials from the public
school classroom, which was part of a larger struggle between competing
religious and political factions in the Northeast.

Yet there is little

evidence to support the contention that this decision represented a
defeat for the orthodox position.

This clearly does not jibe with the

Court's view:
Hitherto it has been supposed, that a charity for the instruction
of the poor might be good and valid in England even if it did not
go beyond the establishment of a grammar-school. And in America,
it has been thought, in the absence of any express legal
prohibitions, that the donor might select the studies, as well as
the classes of persons, who were to receive his bounty without
being compellable to make religious instruction a necessary part of
those studies. It has hitherto been thought sufficient, if he does
not require any thing to be taught inconsistent with Christianity
(2 How. 127, 201 ).
Many of these issues were addressed again at greater length in the
series of polygamy decisions late in the century.

These and some later

decisions continued to be informed by the principle that Christianity
was a part of the law of the land, although always "with its appropriate
qualifications."

As William George Torpey observed:

Under this theory, the states adopted a common law recognition of
Christianity, rejecting those portions of the English law on the
subject which were not suited to their institutions. Hence,
freedom for the exercise of Christian beliefs has antedated fr7edom
for the exercise of any belief and freedom for lack of belief.
Police Powers
If "the leading doctrine of constitutional law during the first

268
generation of our National history was the doctrine of vested rights,''
in which "'the whole duty of government is to prevent crime and preserve
contracts,'" a leading characteristic of the second generation under
Chief Justice Roger Taney was "the rapid development of the doctrine of
the police power .

'in the furtherance of the security, morality and

general welfare of the community, save only as it was prevented from
exercising its discretion by very specific restrictions in the written
Constitution.'"
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In an early test of the police powers of local

governments, the Court upheld a public health ordinance in New Orleans
which made it unlawful to convey and expose any dead person, except in
an obituary chapel.

An epidemic of yellow fever was given as the reason

for the regulation but the ordinance was challenged as discriminatory
because it prevented the celebration of the Catholic funeral obsequies
in a consecrated church.

In this case, Permoli v. First Municipality, 3

How. 589 (1845), the Court commented only briefly on the religious
liberty issue when it reiterated the stance it had earlier taken in
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), that the provisions of the Bill
of Rights did not apply to the states.
The Constitution makes no provlslon for protecting the citizens of
the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to
the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition
imposed by the Constitution o~ the United States in this respect on
the states (3 How. 589, 609).
The Court claimed to lack jurisdiction in the case because the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which had served as the territorial charter
of Louisiana and provided a generous guarantee of religious liberty, had
been superseded by the state constitution.

But the fact that the

Louisiana constitution originally had to pass muster with Congress makes
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it doubtful that such a law was ever constitutional or that a legal
remedy was unavailable.
Years later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the
Court upheld the validity of a compulsory vaccination requirement.
Although this case did not specifically address the issue of religious
liberty, it was later cited by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), in support of its assertion that religious
practices may be restricted if they pose a threat to public safety,
peace, or order.
Another regulation that falls within the traditional police power
is the setting aside of compulsory periods of rest, such as curfews and
Sunday observances.

The first case of this kind to reach the Supreme

Court was Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28 (1859), a libel case that
concerned the right of a ship's master to discharge his cargo on a day
proclaimed as a fast by the governor of Massachusetts.

The Court

dismissed the libel, asserting that the ship had made good delivery of
the cargo and that a fast day did not have the same force of law as a
Sunday observance.

Thus a carrier was not bound to postpone the

discharge of his cargo because its recipient was observing a voluntary
holiday.
The consignee may think it proper to keep Saturday as his Sabbath,
and to observe Friday as a fast day, or other church festival, or
he may postpone the removal of the goods because his warehouse is
not in order to receive them; but he cannot exercise his rights at
the expense of others, and compel the carrier to stand as insurer
of his property, to suit his convenience or his conscience (23 How.
28, 40).
Additionally, the Court surveyed the history of Sunday labor laws,
which showed that the original purpose of these laws was to relieve the
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hardships of slaves and poor laborers.

Even so, the multiplication of

holidays during the late Middle Ages eventually created problems: "But
afterwards, when these vassals were enfranchised and tilled the earth
for themselves, they complained that 'they were ruined' by the number of
church festivals or compulsory holidays" (23 How. 28, 41 ).

Yet even at

that time, "the lading and unlading of ships engaged in maritime
commerce" were among the exceptions recognized under canon law.

The

Court thought it "would certainly present a strange anomaly" that
observances might be reestablished with increased rigor in the
nineteenth century "which both priest and sovereign in the seventeenth
have been compelled to abolish as nuisances."

Although the later

Puritans who settled Massachusetts "enforced the most rigid observance
of the Lord's day as a Sabbath," they repudiated all other holidays
because they "'did not desire to again be brought in bondage, to observe
days and months, and times and years"' ( 23 How. 28, 43) .
Laws that restricted working hours and which included Sunday
provisions were subsequently challenged in several cases, such as
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113
U.S. 703 (1885), but the Court did not deliberate on the
constitutionality of Sunday legislation until 1961.

But two rulings

near the turn of the century clearly indicated the Court's answer to
that question.

In Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896), a divided

Court upheld a law forbidding the operation of freight trains on Sunday.
The earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia was cited to the
effect that, although "'religious views and feelings may have had a
controlling influence'" in the selection of the particular day of the
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week set aside as the day of rest, this consideration was not
"'destructive of the police nature and character of the statute,'" even
if some of the duties specified in the Ten Commandments were adopted:
"Those of them which are purely and exclusively religious in their
nature cannot be made civil duties, but all the rest of them may
be, in so far as they involve conduct, as distinguished from mere
operations of mind or states of the affections. Opinions may
differ, and they really do differ, as to whether abstaining from
labor on Sunday is a religious duty; but whether it is or is not,
it is certain that the legislature of Georgia has prescribed it as
a civil duty" (163 U.S. 299, 307}.
Citing an earlier precedent that was set in Wilson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh Company, 2 Pet. 245 (1829), the Court ruled that a state
police regulation was valid as long as it did not conflict with any
existing law of Congress.

Justice John Harlan wrote for the majority:

In our opinion, there is nothing in the legislation in question
which suggests that it was enacted with the purpose to regulate
commerce, or with any other purpose than to prescribe a rule of
civil duty for all who, on the Sabbath day, are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state. It is nonetheless a civil
regulation because the day in which the running of freight trains
is prohibited is kept by many under a sense of religious duty (163
u.s. 299, 304}.
But Chief Justice Melville Fuller saw the matter differently, urging in
his dissent that only Congress has the power to limit the freedom of
interstate commerce in any way.
Four years later, the Court upheld a Minnesota law in Petit v.
Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900), that prohibited all labor on Sunday
except works of necessity or charity, and specifically included the
operation of barber shops in the prohibition.

Chief Justice Fuller

showed that his objection in the Georgia case had been a narrow one when
he spoke for the unanimous Court: "We have uniformly recognized state
laws relating to the observance of Sunday as enacted in the legitimate

272
exercise of the police power of the state" (177 U.S. 164, 165).
Despite the care taken by the state and federal courts to uphold
Sunday laws as civil regulations, it is difficult to deny that they had
the effect of establishing the Christian sabbath.

Yet unless one

assumes that a secularization of Christianity or a civil religion had
already taken place, it is unlikely that the Court recognized any real
conflict with the establishment clause.

This conclusion deserves an

explanation in light of the later official position of the Court that
the founders intended to erect a high and impregnable wall of separation
between religion and the state.

Perhaps the explanation is simply--as

Robert Cord and others have contended--that a religious establishment,
respecting which Congress shall make no law, has been historically
understood in the narrow sense of an official, exclusive,
state-controlled, tax-financed, sectarian church.

Freedom from religion

was not among the advantages contemplated by the authors of the First
Amendment.
Sunday observances were then part of the normal fabric of social
life.

Indeed, probably no other civil exercise of a religious character

ever enjoyed more ecumenical support, defended by Catholics,
Presbyterians, and Baptists alike.

While the specific cases that came

to the Court's attention involved state laws, even the federal
government did not ordinarily conduct business on Sunday.

Despite a

gradual erosion of support, which was marked by the general acceptance
of Sunday baseball in the 1920s, Sunday laws were still the rule rather
than the exception as late as the 1960s.

10

The persistence of this institution cannot be simply explained away
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as a thoughtless concession to a tradition that had outlived its
usefulness.

While there may be considerable merit in the claim that, by

time and custom, the traditions of the church are being domesticated
into an unofficial civil religion, even a variant form of Christianity,
it is a doubtful step that leads from there to the conclusion that the
Court might be blind to the difference.

Even recently, in an opinion

upholding a traditional religious display on public property, Chief
Justice Warren Burger resisted any such equation of religion with its
cultural accretions by refusing to grant that the Court's decision
placed the creche on the same level as the cruder secular customs of the
Christmas holiday.

The ruling in this case, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104

S.Ct. 1355 (1984), represents such a-clear departure from its own
establishment clause tests that it may signal the beginning of their
reexamination as suggested by Justice William Rehnquist earlier in his
dissenting opinion in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-727
( 1981 ) .
Consensus-Building
Following the Civil War, the Supreme Court took the lead on a wider
range of issues involving civil and religious liberty, both personal and
corporate.

The emergence of the central government from the conflict as

the dominant partner in the federal union at first met with resistance
from the justices as they began taking a more active role in reviewing
federal and state legislation.

The Court moderated or overruled many of

the more radical features of the Reconstruction, as it later did with
the New Deal, during the first surge of this new judicial activism.

But
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this middle period of the Court's history eventually ended, as it began,
with the Court being forced to concede much--if not most=-of the
contested constitutional ground to Congress, the President, and the
bureaucracy.
The defeats the Court suffered on issues of constitutional law,
economics, and social policy are nowhere in evidence in its decisions on
various religious issues.

Here the Court enjoyed virtually a free hand

to shape the relationship between church, school, and state.
Test Oaths
In its contest with the Radical Republicans, the Court threw down
the gauntlet in April of 1866 when, in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2
(1866), a treason case, it struck down the wartime use of military
tribunals in localities where civil courts were still in operation, thus
vindicating the position taken by the Supreme Court of Indiana in
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863).

Congress responded to this

decision with a law reducing the membership of the Court.

The release

of the Court's opinion in December aroused severe public censure.

11

The Court soon stirred the waters again with two more findings in
the same vein.

In Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), it

overruled provisions of the new Missouri state constitution that
required certain classes of individuals--in this case a Roman Catholic
priest==to take a loyalty oath.

As evidence of his unfitness to perform

his pastoral and teaching duties, the priest was accused of having
emigrated to Missouri to avoid the draft.

On the same day in Ex parte

Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867), it struck down a federal law requiring
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attorneys admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court to take a similar
oath.

In both cases, the Court based its decision on the

unconstitutionality of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.

The

four dissenting justices, however, could see no resemblance between an
affirmation of loyalty and the dispossession of the heirs of a condemned
criminal.

While the attorneys raised the issues of religious liberty

and the power of a state to establish a religion, anticipating some of
the later conscientious objection cases, these concerns were incidental
to the Court's determination.
Church Property
The war that pitted brother against brother and father against son
also split churches.

In Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1871), a schism

within the Presbyterian Church brought Walnut Street Presbyterian Church
of Louisville, Kentucky to the center of attention over the question of
legal ownership of church property.

The case had been held under

advisement since the previous term when the arguments were heard.

John

M. Harlan was one of the attorneys for the appellees.
Justice Samuel Miller expressed regret at the beginning and the end
of his opinion that such a controversy should be brought before a
secular court.

But since an appeal had been made, he noted that

religious organizations "come before us in the same attitude as other
voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes . .

"

The case hinged on the question of which of two factions represented the
lawful session of the church.

The appellants, who were numerically in

the minority, claimed to represent the original principles of the
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religious society.
The Court distinguished three classes of cases concerning the
property rights of ecclesiastical bodies.

The first class includes

trusts dedicated to the support of a specific doctrine or teaching.
In such case, if the trust is confided to a religious congregation
of the independent or congregational form of church government, it
is not in the power of the majority . . . , by reason of a change
of views on religious subjects, to carry the property so confided
to them to the support of new and conflicting doctrine (13 Wall.
679, 723).
A second class covers independent congregations.

The courts must

determine the principle of government by which the church operates,
whether majority rule, elder rule, or some other basis.

In these cases,

no inquiry can be made into the religious opinions of those comprising
the legal organization, "for, if such was permitted, a very small
minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found
to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the
founders of the church" ( 13 Wall. 679, 725).
The third and most common class of cases involves the property of
congregations that are subordinate members of a general church
organization governed by superior tribunals.

In this class and in the

case at hand, the Court held that whatever is decided upon a question
"by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has
been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final,
and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them"
(13 Wall. 679, 727).
Here Justice Miller drew a sharp contrast with the doctrine of
English courts, which were empowered inquire into the true standard of
faith in the church organization, a practice which tended to
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disadvantage dissenting churches:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded
to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support
of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize
voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals
for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the
individual members, congregations, and officers within the general
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a
body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are
bound to submit to it (13 Wall. 679, 729).
This doctrine was more suited to a constitution of limited powers and
left little doubt that the Court meant to break with the traditional
role of the Lord Chancellor as the conscience of the sovereign.

Absent

the broad power of inquiry once vested in that office, the Court could
not do otherwise than rule that the appellees held legal title to the
property.

Two justices dissented over another issue, believing that

because a suit in state court was pending at the time it heard the
complaint the decision of the Circuit Court should be reversed and
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Although the Court has recently begun making significant departures
from the Watson doctrine, the decision stands as the major precedent in
this field.

It was reaffirmed in Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918),

and later cited in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280
U.S. 1 (1929).

In the latter case, in which the petitioner claimed a

right by inheritance to the surplus net income earned from a perpetual
chaplaincy, Justice Louis Brandeis rejected the claim, maintaining that
the canon law in force at the time governs, not that which may have
applied in 1820 when the chaplaincy was created.

Several years earlier,
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in Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908), and
Santos v. Holy Roman Catholic Church, 212 U.S. 463 (1909), the Court
recognized the legal personality of the Catholic Church.

In the Ponce

case, it noted that its capacity of the Church to enjoy property was
established by the edict of Constantine in 321 A.D. and held that the
use of state funds to repair a church building does not entail any claim
over the property by a municipality.

The Court also held that the

municipal law of an acquired territory remains in force unless it
violates the Constitution.
Polygamy
Although the Watson case did not directly raise a First Amendment
question, Justice Miller's brief exposition of a constitutional doctrine
of religious liberty laid a foundation for the Court's interpretation of
the establishment and free exercise clauses during the second period.

A

series of cases involving Mormon polygamy in the western territories of
Utah and Idaho provided the Court with an opportunity to explore the
implications of this doctrine in greater depth.
The decisions in two of these cases are particularly important
because they set forth the initial standard by which the Court
interpreted the nature and scope of the free exercise guarantees of the
First Amendment.

The first of these, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.

145 (1878), was brought on a petition by a man who had been tried and
convicted in a federal court on charges of polygamy.
Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote the opinion in this unanimous
decision.

Regarding the law banning polygamy, he first observed that
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Congress cannot pass a law .prohibiting the free exercise of religion:
''Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United
States, so far as congressional interference is concerned.

The question

to be determined is, whether the law now under consideration comes
within this prohibition'' (98 U.S. 145, 162).

He also noted that the

word 1'religion" is not defined in the Constitution and turned to the
history of the times in order to determine what was meant by religious
freedom:
Before the adoption of the Constitution, attempts were made in some
of the colonies and States to legislate not only in respect of
religion, but in respect to its doctrines and precepts as well.
The people were taxed, against their will, for the support of
religion, and sometimes for the support of particular sects to
whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe.
Punishments
were prescribed for a failure to attend upon public worship, and
sometimes for entertaining heretical opinions. The controversy
upon this general subject was animated in many of th~ States, but
seemed at last to culminate in Virginia (98 U.S. 145, 1~2-63).
Chief Justice Waite observed that the long fight to assure
religious freedom culminated in the passage of the First Amendment.
Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was cited
as an expression of the purpose behind the amendment.

It contains the

following key passage:
"Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in
behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere
satisfaction, the progress of those sentiments which tend to
restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural
right in opposition to his social duties" (98 U.S. 145, 164).
From this review, Chief Justice Waite suggested that "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free
to reach actions which were in violation of social duties and subversive
of good order . . . " (98 U.S. 145, 164).

He reiterated this idea in the

now famous passage which is now used as the basic free exercise test:
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"Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices" ( 98 U.S. 145, 166) .

Turning briefly to a his tory of laws

prohibiting polygamy, he concluded:
In the face of the evidence, it is impossible to believe that the
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of
social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred
obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil
contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be
said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and
social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous
marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the
government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests.
Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,
and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in
connection with monogamy (98 U.S. 145, 165-66).
A religious exception for polygamy, like one for human sacrifice or
for suttee, would introduce a new element into the criminal law: "To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself.

Government could exist only in name under

such circumstances" ( 98 U.S. '145, 167) .
The

R~ynolds

case proved to be only the opening round in a

controversy that continues to this day.

Anson Phelps Stokes summarized

the events that followed:
In 1882 Congress passed the Edmunds Act, which punished actual
polygamy by disfranchisement, imprisonment, and other penalties.
Five years later the corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints was dissolved by the Federal government.
Effective resistance was no longer possible~ Hundreds of
polygamists suffered fines and imprisonment, over one thousand were
disfranchise~~ and much of the property of the Church was
confiscated.
It was in this volatile political situation that Davis v. Beason,
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133 U.S. 333 (1890), was brought on appeal from a territorial court in
Idaho by a member of the Mormon Church who was convicted for conspiring
to unlawfully register to vote.

The appellant challenged the

constitutionality of an 1882 law disfranchising Mormons.

But the Court

would only consider whether the territorial court had jurisdiction to
try the defendant.

Justice Stephen Field wrote the opinion in this

unanimous decision:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries . . . . To call their advocacy a tenet of
religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. If they are
crimes, then to teach, advise and counsel their practice is to aid
in their commission, and such teaching and counseling are
themselves criminal and proper subjects of punishment, as aiding
and abetting crime are in all other cases (133 U.S. 333, 341-42).
Perhaps the most significant feature of the opinion is its
definition of religion:
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverenc~ for
his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often
confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect,
but is distinguishable from the latter. The First Amendment to the
Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or forbidding the free
exercise thereof, was intended to allow everyone under the
jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions
respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as
may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his
sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not
injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit
legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes
of worship of any sect (133 U.S. 333, 342).
This differentiation between religion and a particular sectarian
form of. worship was not a novel one, having been used by Justice Story
in the Girard College case.

But it was also not free of ambiguity.

Justice Field appears to have reserved the term religion to denote, in a
positive sense,

the common faith of the people that undergirded the
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political and legal system.

In this sense, the First Amendment

protected the exercise of religion--practices as well as
beliefs--against any interference.

On the other hand, he appears to

have used the word "sect" exclusively in contexts that suggest
criminality or religious intolerance: "Crime is not less odious because
sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion."
Whether he based this dichotomy on historic Christian values, natural
law, or a changeable community standard is only intimated rather than
openly stated.

It is clear, however, that Justice Field wanted to rule

out of court any attempt to claim the sanction of religion as a criminal
defense.
It was never intended or supposed that the Amendment could be
invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society. With
man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they
impose, and the manner in which an expression on those subjects, no
interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society,
designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its
people, are not interfered with . . . . Probably never before in the
history of this country has it been seriously contended that the
whole punitive power of government, for acts recognized by the
general consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper
matters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order
that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be
carried out without hindrance (133 U.S. 333, 342-43).
The Reynolds and Davis rulings represent the first and possibly
most important step the Supreme Court took toward defining the nature
and limits of the free exercise protections.

But these decisions, in

turn, were only part of a long series of cases that identified the front
lines in the clash between public policy and Mormon Church practice.

In

Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881 ), and Clawson v. United
States, 114 U.S. 477 (1885), the Court upheld the exclusion of potential
jurors--from a trial jury and grand jury respectively--for bias.

Both
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cases involved Mormons.
Suffrage was the issue in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
Justice Stanley Matthews wrote for the Court:
The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the Territories
are secured to them, as to other citizens, by the principles of
constitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies of the
government, State and National; their political rights are
franchises which they hold as privileges in the legislative
discretion of the Congress of the United States (114 U.S. 15,
44-45).
The Court also denounced bigamy and concluded that the "holy state of
matrimony" is the "sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in
our civilization" (114 U.S. 15, 45).
In Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885), the Court ruled
that the mere cohabitation of a married man with another woman he
represented as his wife was sufficient to convict him, even in the
absence of a sexual connection.

But Justices Miller and Field regarded

this interpretation as a "strained construction of a highly penal
statute" and dissented.
Two other cases involved the same party, one Lorenzo Snow, who had
seven wives.

In the first, Snow v. United States, 118 U.S. 346 (1886),

the Court held that it had no jurisdiction in this instance due to the
small size of the fines imposed on Snow, who was convicted on three
separate charges of cohabitation.

It also vacated its judgment in the

Cannon case for want of jurisdiction.

But the following year, In re

Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887), was brought up on an appeal for a writ of
habeas corpus, which had been refused by a lower court.

This time the

Court adopted the argument of George Ticknor Curtis, which had
originated with George Sutherland, l3 that cohabiting with more than one
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spouse is a continuous offense rather than an isolated act.

This ruling

prevented multiple indictments.
An altogether different question was raised when the Court heard an
appeal by the Mormon Church itself in Late Corporation of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890)--decree entered May 25, 1891, 140 U.S. 665 (1891 )--after Congress
had revoked the

church~s

charter and seized some of its property.

The Mormon Church had originally been chartered by the government
of Mexico.

In a brief for the United States, the Attorney General

claimed that the church was empowered by its corporate charter to
enforce "every religious duty promulgated by the church."

One provision

virtually established it as a theocracy, extending "the law-making power
of the corporation so as to embrace generally all the duties of Man to
his Maker.

Among others, it extends it specially to tithes, or

.
t.l th es. ".I 4
co 11 ec t lng

This clause read as follows:

Provided, however, That each and every act or practice so
established or adopted, for law or custom, shall relate to
solemnities, sacraments, ceremonies, consecrations, endowments,
tithings, marriages, fellowship, or the religious duties of man to
his Maker, inasmuch as the doctrines, principles, practices, and
performances, support virtue and increase morality, and are not
inconsistent with or repugnant to the Constitution of the United
Statey or of this State, and are founded on the revelations of the
Lord. 5
In a sharply divided decision, the majority upheld the act of 1887
as falling within the prerogative of parens patriae and approved the
distribution of some of the seized property to the common schools of
Utah, citing the common law doctrine of cy-pres to the effect that if a
charitable purpose should fail the sovereign may rededicate property to
a related charitable object.

But the Court refused to consider any
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further use of the property by the church or for the purpose of
preaching, upholding, promoting, and defending polygamy.

Justice Joseph

Bradley wrote:
The existence of such a propaganda is a blot on our civilization.
The organization of a community for the spread and practice of
polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary
to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which
Christianity has produced in the Western world. The question,
therefore, is whether the promotion of such a nefarious system and
practice, so repugnant to our laws and to the principles of our
civilization, is to be allowed to continue by the sanction of the
government itself; and whether the funds accumulated for that
purpose shall be restored to the same unlawful uses as heretofore,
to the detriment of the true interests of civil society (136 U.S.
1' 49).
The Court refused to be moved by "the pretence of religious
conviction" or what Justice Field had earlier called "mere religious
belief" as a plea:
One pretence for this obstinate course is, that their belief in the
practice of polygamy, or in the right to indulge in it, is a
religious belief, and, therefore, under the protection of the
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. This is altogether a
sophistical plea (136 U.S. 1, 49).
The use of the church property for illegal purposes justified its
seizure and diversion.

The Court here relied on the concept of the

church as a charitable public trust, a doctrine that grew out of an
established church context, in which the sovereign reigned as the
supreme head of the church.

The class of cases involving the

administration and application of charitable estates fell within the
ordinary jurisdiction of the English chancery courts.

But in cases that

were beyond the jurisdiction of the English courts of chancery, "the
king as parens patriae, under his sign manual, disposes of the fund to
such uses, analogous to those intended, as seems to him expedient and
wise" (136 U.S. 1, 51-52).

286

Having noted that the "principles of the law of charities . . .
prevail in all countries pervaded by the spirit of Christianity," the
Court simply adopted them under the inherent parens patriae prerogative
of the state, insisting that this "most beneficent function" had "no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the
destruction of their liberties" (136 U.S. 1, 57).

It did acknowledge,

however, that charities were not similarly favored in many states, where
the property reverted to the donors, their heirs, or their
representatives.
Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justices Field and Lucius Q. C.
Lamar, vigorously dissented and maintained that Congress had far
exceeded its limited constitutional authority:
I regard it of vital consequence, that absolute power should never
be conceded as belonging under our system of government to any one
of its departments. The legislative power of Congress is delegated
and not inherent, and is therefore limited. I agree that the power
to make needful rules and regulations for the Territories
necessarily comprehends the power to suppress crime; and it is
immaterial even though that crime assumes the form of a religious
belief or creed. Congress has the power to extirpate polygamy in
any of the Territories, by the enactment of a criminal code
directed to that end; but it is not authorized under the cover of
that power to seize and confiscate the property of persons,
individuals, or corporations, without office found, because they
may have been guilty of criminal practices (136 U.S. 1, 67).
The Chief Justice also found fault with the Court's peculiar application
of the doctrine of cy-pres:
The doctrine of cy-pres is one of construction, and not of
administration. By it a fund devoted to a particular charity is
applied to a cognate purpose, and if the purpose for which this
property was accumulated was such as has been depicted, it cannot
be brought within the rule of application to a purpose as nearly as
possible resembling that denounced. Nor is there here any
counterpart in Congressional power to the exercise of the royal
prerogative in the disposition of a charity. If this property was
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accumulated for purposes declared illegal, that does not justify
its arbitrary disposition by judicial legislation (136 U.S. 1,
67-68).
But the Court reaffirmed its position in United States v. Late
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 150 U.S.
145 (1893), when it returned the church property--which had been placed
in receivership--for charitable uses.
These stern measures ultimately had their desired effect.

In 1890,

the head of the Mormon Church issued a pronouncement repudiating
polygamous marriages.

Six years later, Utah was admitted as a state on

the condition that plural marriages be forever prohibited.

Anson

Stokes, who chronicled the active role played by churches in this
controversy, commented:
Thus came to an end a memorable controversy which had aroused the
Christian people of the nation, who felt that polygamy was contrary
to the Jewish-Christian moral code of the Bible, on which its
ideals and law were largely based. They took the ground that the
government could not tolerate any practice that was contrary to
fundamental Christian ethics, and pointed fg the many decisions of
American courts taking this point of view.
But it has proven more difficult to root out the practice of
polygamy than its doctrinal supports.

Cases still surface periodically.

The resulting hardship is suggested by In re State in the Interest of
Black, 283 P.2d 887 (1955), in which polygamous parents lost custody of
their children on grounds of ''child neglect."

The charge exemplified

the state's willingness to go to considerable lengths and to resort to
novel devices in the exercise of its police power.
The cases that reached the Court following the Second World War
illustrate the continuing dilemma as well as the political and moral
strains of the period.

In Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455
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(1946), it reversed the conviction of a polygamist on federal kidnapping
charges.

But in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), a

divided Court upheld the conviction of Mormon fundamentalists under the
Mann Act, which forbade the interstate transportation of "any woman or
girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other
immoral purpose."

Justice Frank Murphy criticized the Court's depiction

of polygamy as promiscuity and its continued wilingness to widen the
scope of the act beyond its express purpose of ending the white slave
traffic.

In Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), an equally divided

Court ruled unconstitutional a statute that outlawed the advocacy of
polygamy as a conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals.
These cases have left some troubling questions in their wake.

On

the one hand, it is evident that the test stated in the Davis case was
simply a logical development of the Watson doctrine.

Justice William 0.

Douglas was probably recalling this test and his own opinion in the
Cleveland case when he later wrote that "a 'religious' rite which
violates standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true
sense, in the constitutional sense, included within 'religion,' the
'free exercise' of which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."

17

Similarly, R. J. Rushdoony has noted the preferred status historically
enjoyed by Christianity in particular and theism in general:
The structure of state represents, implicitly or explicitly, a
particular religion. Implicit in the Court's decision was the
equation of Christian moral standards with civilization. The legal
structure they defended was implicitly Christian. It is other
religions which are restricted to ''mere opinion" when they ~re in
1
conflict with the religious establishment of American law.
On the other hand, the law has lacked clear standards for
determining appropriate restrictions on deviant practices like polygamy.
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The dissenters in three of these cases expressed doubts about the
fairness of the often severe measures that were taken.
This series of cases involving members of a single religious sect
was paralleled once again the the 1940s by a number of cases involving
Jehovah's Witnesses.

The two series had features in common.

Both

involved unpopular native religious minorities whose behavior offended
the common beliefs and customs of the people.

Both sects were thought

to seriously endanger the safety of their own members as well as others
in the community.

Both threatened to upset the existing political and

religious consensus.

If the importance of the first series lies in the

moral bounds it set to the free exercise of religion, the second was
important for broadening ordinary civil bounds governing social commerce
for the sake of enhancing existing constitutional liberties.
The Trinity Case
The definitive judicial statement regarding the Christian character
of the American constitutional system is probably the lengthy obiter
dictum by Justice David Brewer in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

At issue was the validity of the church's

contract with an English citizen who was called to New York to serve as
the church's rector and pastor.

Justice Brewer, writing for the

unanimous Court, conceded that immigration officials had correctly
applied a provision of the Alien Contract Labor Law that prohibited the
prepayment by any citizen of passage for immigrants under contract to
perform labor or service of any kind.

But he cited testimony indicating

that Congress intended only to stop certain companies from importing
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unskilled workers at low wages in order to break down the labor market.
Justice Brewer reviewed the laws and charters of the American
colonies, the national and state constitutions, and various court
opinions to show that "no purpose of action against religion can be
imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a
religious people."

After this lengthy survey, he passed to American

customs, called attention to the massive support given to Christian
missions, and then observed:
These, and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume
of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that
this is a Christian nation. In the face of all these, shall it be
believed that a Congress of the United States intended to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the
services of a C?§istian minister residing in another nation (143
u.s. 457, 471 )?
Judging that the language of the statute was "broad enough to reach
cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm
could not intentionally have been legislated against," he concluded:
It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say
that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act,
although within the letter, is not within the intention of the
legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute (140 U.S.
457, 472).
Federal Aid
Two early cases involving agencies of the Roman Catholic Church
raised the issue of financial aid for religious organizations.

The

first, Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), was an appeal from an
unsuccessful suit by a taxpayer of the District of Columbia to prevent
payments by the federal treasury to a hospital operated by a Catholic
sisterhood as compensation for the treatment of poor patients under a
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contract.

Justice Rufus Peckham upheld the earlier ruling, emphasizing

that the hospital was a nonsectarian, secular corporation and not--as
the complainant alleged--a sectarian institution because nothing to that
effect appeared in the articles of incorporation.

He added that the

religious affiliation of the individuals who compose the corporation
. . . is not of the slightest consequence with reference to the law
of its incorporation, nor can the individual beliefs upon religious
matters of the various incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it
material that the corporation may be conducted under the auspices
of the Roman Catholic Church (175 U.S. 291, 298).
This decision may have been a mixed blessing for churches, however,
because for all practical purposes incorporation transformed religious
institutions into creatures of the state.

To be sure, the Terrett case,

like the later Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819),
clearly specified that the authority of the state over corporations is
limited.

But the establishment implications remain.

Vested property

rights were already being curtailed for the sake of a variety of new
economic and social values.
the power to regulate.

20

Moreover, the power to create involves

In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1905),

for example, a divided Court held that since a corporation--in this case
a business corporation--is a creature of the state it lacks a
constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers to
inspection at the suit of the state.

In principle, this rule applies to

churches, as well.
In the other case involving the aid question, Quick Bear v. Leupp,
210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court ruled that an 1897 law prohibiting federal
support of sectarian schools applied only to "gratuitous payments of
public moneys" and not to treaty funds or trust funds.

It held that

292
payments made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs toward the support
of Catholic mission schools came from treaty funds which belonged to the
Sioux.

Chief Justice Fuller wrote that "we cannot concede the

proposition that Indians cannot be allowed to use their own money in
schools of their own choice because the government is necessarily
undenominational, as it cannot make any law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (210 U.S. 50,
81-82).

The question of aid to private schools still remained to be

addressed.

But in the meantime, the Court had to decide issues

affecting the very existence of independent education in this country.
Private Schools
National sentiments reached a high pitch of intensity during and
following the First World War.

Various ethnic groups and labor unions

were suspected of harboring revolutionary ideas.

Nativist organization

like the Ku Klux Klan capitalized on sundry fears about blacks,
Catholics, and immigrants.

War and massive migration brought about a

clash of cultures that sent tremors throughout the western world.
Overseas, the term "Americanization" became a term of reproach for all
that was cheap and tawdry about the burgeoning popular culture that
quickly spread beyond our shores.

At home, "Americanization" signified

the democratic ideal to which public and even private education were
being consecrated.
As part of a general Americanization program, several states that
had sizable immigrant communities passed laws under their police power
prohibiting the teaching of any school subjects in a foreign language.
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In Nebraska, where half the population was not more than two generations
removed from Continental Europe, Robert Meyer, a teacher at a Lutheran
parochial school, was arrested and convicted on criminal charges for
teaching Bible stories to his pupils in the German language after
regular school hours.
The ruling by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Meyer v. State, 107
Nebr. 657, 661-62 (1922), shows the court's clear perception of the
connection between language and ideology:
The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had
seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners, who had taken
residence in this country to rear and educate their children in the
language of their native land. The result of that condition was
found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of
foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early
childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear
them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate
them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a
consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments
foreign to the best interest of this country.
The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court as
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), along with four other cases from
Nebraska, Iowa, and Ohio that were decided together as Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923).

One of the attorneys for Meyer, Arthur Francis

Mullen, conceded the power of the state to require the teaching of
English but denied it had the right to prohibit the teaching of foreign
languages as an optional subject.

Under questioning by the justices, he

reviewed the very revealing legislative history of the law.

An attempt

in 1919 to abolish all private primary education passed the
House--Nebraska still had a bicameral legislature at the time--but
failed in the Senate by a single vote.
was then substituted and passed.

A law regulating private schools

Afterwards, the language prohibition
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law was added to the package.

By the Nebraska Supreme Court's own

admission, the purpose of the law, he said, was "to stop religious
instruction in any school in the State until the child can understand
the English language."

He continued:

The compulsory system, requiring children to attend some school,
public or private, was first enacted in 1852. And now it is
seriously argued that a legislative majority can change the entire
history of the human race, and by its mere fiat take my children
and require me to send them to a public school, and have the course
of study absolutely regulated by the State. I deny that 2 fny such
legislative power exists in a constitutional government.
Justice James McReynolds, writing for the majority, likened the
Nebraska legislation to the Ideal Commonwealth of Plato and the garrison
state of Sparta, which submerged the individual for the sake of
developing ideal citizens, then added:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual
and state were Hholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly Hill be affirmed that any
Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a
state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with
American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions
of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences
during the late Har and aversion toHard every character of
truculent adversaries Here certainly enough to quicken that
aspiration. But the means adopted, He think, exceed the
limitations upon the power of the state and conflict Hith rights
assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough
and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic
tranquility has been shoHn (262 U.S. 390, 402).
Although the Court did not question the state's right to compel
attendance at some school or to regulate such schools, it did hold that
"a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means" (262 U.S. 390,
401).
But in the next case in the series, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
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268 U.S. 510 (1925), the power of the state to abolish private schools
altogether was finally raised.

A campaign against private elementary

schools in Oregon that was spearheaded by the Ku Klux Klan with the
cooperation of a radical faction of the Scottish Rite Masons led to
passage of the Compulsory Education Act of 1922 by popular initiative.

22

The Society of Sisters, which still operates St. Mary's Academy in
Portland, and Hill Military Academy--now the site of Portland Bible
College--obtained restraining orders to prevent enforcement of the
statute.

Although both were incorporated by the state, the Court

unanimously ruled that this fact did not prevent them from seeking
relief from enforcement of a law that would destroy their business and
property.

Justice McReynolds reiterated the Meyer doctrine:

The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations (268 U.S. 510, 535).
A week later, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court
issued the first of a long series of rulings that incorporated specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights--freedom of speech in this case--into
the liberty guarantee that the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to
the states.

23

The broadened definition of liberty that the Court

adopted in the Meyer and Pierce cases had earlier been suggested by
Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45 (1908), in which the Court upheld a racial segregation law.
But Justice Harlan recognized the wider implications of the decision:
The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the
Almighty for beneficent purposes; and its use may not be forbidden
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or interfered with by government,--certainly not, unless such
instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or
imperils the public safety. The right to impart instruction,
harmless in itself or beneficial to those who receive it, is a
substantial right of property,--especially, where the services are
rendered for compensation. But even it such right be not strictly
a property right, it is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of the
United States (211 U.S. 45, 67).
The last case in this series upholding the rights of private
schools, Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), did not raise a
religious issue because of the exemption enjoyed by sabbath schools but
the Court's ruling has a particular relevance to some of the school
controversies of today.

The law in question required the exclusive

teaching of English and Hawaiian in the public schools of Hawaii.
admitted object was to promote Americanism.

Its

According to Justice

McReynolds,
. . . the school Act and the measures adopted thereunder go far
beyond mere regulation of privately-supported schools where
children obtain instruction deemed valuable by their parents and
which is not obviously in conflict with any public interest. They
give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential
details of such schools, intrust their control to public officers,
and deny both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion
in respect of teachers, curriculum and text-books. Enforcement of
the Act probably would destroy most, if not all of them; and,
certainly, it would deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure
for their children instruction which they think important and we
cannot say is harmful (273 U.S. 284, 298).
Not all the cases involving private schools at this time grew out
of attempts to abolish them or severely curtail their individuality.
One in particular raised a question about the constitutionality of state
aid to private religious schools.

In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board

of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), the first of many cases on this
subject, the Court upheld a Louisiana law that provided "appropriations
for the specific purpose of purchasing school books for the use of the
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children of the state, free of cost to them."

The Court accepted the

child benefit theory set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court and agreed
with its finding that no money was appropriated "'for the use of any
church, private, sectarian or even public school'" (281 U.S. 370, 374).
The common thread that links each of these cases is the
standardization of education--through regulation and subsidization-around a common core of national, cultural, and pedagogical values.
Here the Court construed these values broadly and gave wide berth to the
exercise of dissenting views.

But elsewhere it tipped the balances in

favor of a narrower conception of the public good.
Conscientious Objection
National security is the theme that ties together a similar series
of cases that raised the issue of liberty of conscience.

These cases

resembled and occasionally intersected another series relating to
freedom of expression which, besides the Gitlow case, included Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931 ).

They marked the beginning of the Court's transition from it

role as the guardian of traditional religion to its more recent role the
vanguard of an experimental pluralism.
The prevailing religious accommodation was, in many respects, a
Procrustean bed of doctrinal indifference that fully satisfied none of
the major confessional churches.
cold than others.

But some were left further out in the

Several religious groups are particularly identified

with a historic tradition of conscientious objection to military
service.

Their objections often extend to jury service and the taking
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of oaths.

Ever since the War for Independence, state and national laws

have usually made provision for objectors in the form of exemptions and
alternative forms of service.

A national draft exemption was passed in

1864 to cover members of religious denominations who declared their
conscientious opposition to bearing arms.

When the United States

entered the First World War, however, conscription for service in a
foreign war was instituted for the first time.

The constitutionality of

the Draft Act of 1917 was soon tested in Arver v. United States, also
known as Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
A detailed brief for the plaintiffs examined the origins of the
militia, its history of local control, and its traditional protection
against service abroad.

It pointed out that the Saxon kings organized

the militia by counties.

Attempts by William the Conqueror to raise a

standing army in England were met with popular resistance.

As for

conscription, it applied at first only to paupers and vagabonds.
In his study of the English Constitution, A. V. Dicey noted that
while a militia may be converted into a standing army it cannot be
required to serve abroad.

24

This appears to have also been the

understanding of the American fathers at the time our Constitution was
written.

During the War for Independence, a provision authorizing

Congress to summon the militia to enforce treaties was dropped at the
. . t ence o f Governeur Morrls.
. 25
lnsls
The Court, however, upheld the statute, made only a passing
reference to the English tradition, and dismissed as unsound the
proposition that religious exemptions violated the First Amendment.
Another generation passed before the Court dealt directly with
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conscientious objection to conscription.

By appearing to skirt what

might otherwise seem to be the most important issue, the Court indicated
that the real issue transcended any species of conscientious objection.
In the meantime, several cases raised questions about the
interpretation of the Naturalization Act of 1906.

In the first of

these, Schwimmer v. United States, 283 U.S. 644 (1929), the Court upheld
a refusal of citizenship to a Hungarian woman described as "an
uncompromising pacifist with no sense of nationalism but only a cosmic
sense of belonging to the human family . . . " (283 U.S. 644, 648).

The

dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., resembled his earlier
dissent in the Abrams case:
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought--not
free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that
principle with regard to admission into, as well as life within
this country. And recurring to the opinion that bars this
applicant's way, I would suggest that the Quakers have done their
share to make the country what it is, that many citizens agree with
the applicant's belief and that I had not supposed hitherto that we
regretted our inability to expel them because they believe more
than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount (283
u.s. 644, 655).
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931 ), and its companion
case, United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931 ), were scarcely
distinguishable from the Schwimmer case.

The respondent in the first

case was Douglas Clyde Macintosh, a Canadian citizen who was an ordained
Baptist minister and a theology professor at Yale Divinity School.
Although he had served as a chaplain in the Canadian Army during the
First World War and was not a professed pacifist, he declined to
"promise in advance to bear arms in defense of the United States unless
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he believed the war to be morally justified . . . " (283 U.S. 605, 613).
Both sides of the divided Court admitted the religious basis of his
refusal to take the prescribed oath but still reversed the ruling of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, which had been in his favor.
The majority and the four dissenters diverged most noticeably in
the frankly theological assumptions they brought to their interpretation
of the scope of protected religious liberty.

Justice George Sutherland

used the Trinity case as a point of departure:
When he speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above
his allegiance to the government it is evident, in the light of his
entire statement, that he means to make his own interpretation of
the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude the
government and stay its hand. We are a Christian people . . . ,
according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and
acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of
God. But, also, we are a nation with the duty to survive; a nation
whose Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose
government must go forward upon the assumption, and safely can
proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the nation
and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those
made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the
will of God (283 U.S. 605, 625).
He also cited the Jacobson case of 1905, which had dealt with compulsory
vaccination, as an example of the limits on the liberties guaranteed to
the individual by the Fourteenth Amendment:
"· . . And yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against
his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary
interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take
his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense" (197 U.S. 11, 29; 283
u.s. 605, 624).
In his dissent, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes drew a parallel
between this oath and the constitutional oath of office, denying that it
was ever the intent of Congress to impose any religious test or that any
promise to support an unjust war could be extorted.

Addressing himself
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to the former, he contended: "I think that the requirement of the oath
of office should be read in the light of our regard from the beginning
for freedom of conscience."

Citing the Davis decision, he wrote:

Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be
recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions
of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within
the domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws
regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power
of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and
submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience,
duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been
maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a
matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our
conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation (283 U.S. 605, 633-34).
But the Court proved no more receptive to such appeals to
conscience in two other cases that involved citizens.

In Hamilton v.

Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), the
unanimous Court affirmed the suspension of three university students who
were members of a Methodist student organization for refusing to take a
required military training course, saying that "California has not
drafted or called them to attend the University'' (293 U.S. 245, 262).
It did indicate, however, that the university--a land grant college--was
only required to offer such a course and noted that two states had
26
recen tl y rna d e l. t e l ec t.lve.
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), was a case involving a
challenge to the test oath required for admission to the bar in
Illinois.

The petitioner, Clyde Wilson Summers,

27

who was a law

professor, had been denied permission to practice law because of his
inability to take the required oath in good faith.

The state found his

objection to the use of force "'inconsistent with the obligations of an
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attorney at law'" (325 U.S. 561, 564 n4).

The Court upheld this action

by the state, noting that Illinois had a constitutional provision
requiring service in the militia in time of war.
dissented.

But four justices

After citing the dissents in the naturalization cases with

approval, Justice Black noted that there had been no draft into the
Illinois militia since 1864 and indicated that anyone holding the
petitioner's views would be covered by an existing exemption:
I cannot agree that a state can lawfully bar from a semi-public
position, a well-qualified man of good character solely because he
entertains a religious belief which might prompt him at some time
in the future to violate a law which has not yet and may never be
enacted. Under our Constitution men are punished for what they do
or fail to do and not for what they think and believe (325 U.S.
561' 578).
The dissenting opinion in the Summers case indicated the direction
in which the Court was beginning to head.

Shortly after the end of the

Second World War, the three naturalization decisions were overruled in
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), a case that involved a
Seventh-Day Adventist.

Justice Douglas repeated the earlier dissenting

arguments and declared that the "test oath is abhorrent to our
tradition."

He also cited more recent opinions which given a broadened

effect to the Fourteenth Amendment protections.

Chief Justice Harlan

Fiske Stone, who had joined the dissents in two of the earlier cases
while serving as an associate justice, dissented this time because
Congress had subsequently adopted the Court's earlier construction of
the naturalization laws.

28

This decision represented one of the first

hints that the Court was beginning to reconsider its views on the nature
of religion and the scope of the religious liberty guarantees.

But the

full impact of the change was not felt until the 1960s and early 1970s.
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Recapitulation
The drive for consensus is one of the great motivating factors in
American law.

It is the search for unity in the midst of plurality.

This purpose is manifested in different ways through almost all the
cases that have thus far been examined.

Along with the Terrett,

Permoli, Cummings, Reynolds, Davis, and Mormon Church cases, the private
school and conscientious objection cases are only the most obvious
examples of a fact that pervades our constitutional history.

It is

equally a religious and a political fact.
One of the ironies of the relationship of church and state in
America that "the least dangerous branch"--itself an offspring of the
old clerical class--has most often been left with the responsibility to
provide a countervailing influence in behalf of the dissenting tradition
from which American politics, culture, and religion originally sprang.
It is particularly ironic that the judiciary has generally done so with
tools once designed to consolidate feudal states into a religiously
unified national state under the aegis of a hereditary monarch.

These

ironies are reflected in the ideological push and pull that lend such
vitality to the Court's otherwise erratic course in the last half
century.

Perhaps it is the ferment of nevJ wine in old bottles.
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